Prediction problems in finance go beyond estimating the unknown parameters of a model (e.g of expected returns). This is because such a model would have to include knowledge about the market participants' propensity to change their opinions on the validity of that model. This leads to a circular situation characteristic of markets, where participants collectively create the target variables they wish to estimate. In this paper, we introduce a framework for generating expectation models and study the conditions under which they are adopted by a majority of market participants.
Introduction
When applying machine learning to the natural or the social sciences the difference is in the level at which patterns are identified and exploited: in natural science, data may be reproduced through repeated probing or experiments, which leads to its classification as an "exact" science. In social science, we study the possibly infinite ways in which people behave given the data. As an example, a natural scientist might be interested in estimating the fill level of oil reservoirs using satellite images, while a social scientist, in particular in the field of finance, worries about how the knowledge about fill levels affects investors' estimates of the scarcity of the commodity. In the latter case, it cannot be assumed that fill levels alone determine the trading levels of oil but other events, e.g. geopolitics may at the same time impact the future supply of oil. The real question is what we believe the majority of other market participants will regard as the relevant piece of information. In other words, the financial market is a beauty contest in which majorities decide on the winner, and objective criteria are only the contestants in a competition for the attention of investors.
Even though the value of an asset may be defined in absolute terms, e.g in terms of discounted cash flows generated by the security, we find that in practice, i.e. over finite investment horizons, value is a relative measure as the price obtained when selling the security at some future instant of time will be set by the aggregate demand at that instant. This leads us to the problem of having to determine not the fundamental value but what others will be ready to pay at the end of our investment period.
Attempts have been made in the economic literature to get around the complexity arising from the self-referential nature of price formation in financial markets. An influential concept was the hypothesis put forward by Muth [1] that the agents' predictions of future payoffs are not systematically wrong. In other words, agents are capable of forming rational expectations which take all available information into account. Grossmann [2] proposes the idea that prices aggregate information that is initially dispersed across investors. In other words, prices make up for the lack of knowledge as they reveal everything there is to be known about the security. We briefly revisit this argument below. Pastor and Veronesi [3] emphasize the fact that many of the phenomena observed in the financial market can be understood once we recognize that parameters in financial prediction models are uncertain and subject to learning. In the book by Vives [4] a differentiation is made between learning by uninformed and informed investors and it is shown that rational well-informed agents may disregard their private information and make persistent errors. A similar phenomenon is studied under the heading of informational cascades [5] and social learning [6] . Townsend [7] points out that private information may introduce a potential infinite regress problem akin to the beauty contest metaphor of Keynes [8] . The problem arises when agents factor in the presence of other agents who also try to forecast the value of the asset. Allen, Morris and Shin [9] study the problem in a homogeneous market populated by Bayesian rational agents and find that there is a bias towards prior information, when agents forecast the forecasts of others. As a result, current price will always be further away from fundamental value and it will also be more sluggish to adjust.
The payoff of assets to investors depends on future states of the economy. All investors face the same problem of not knowing these states and, more importantly, the impact of these states on the decisions of other investors. A natural question is: if I enter a position at price p 0 will I be able to sell the position at some price p * > p 0 in the future? This means that agents in the financial market have to form expectations on other agents expectations, i.e. they have to learn what others think.
In the financial literature p * is associated with some true (fundamental) price which may be known to some but not all market participants (information asymmetry). The rational expectations assumption states that this asymmetry is reduced when participants observe prices which convey information about the aggregate demand and, from there, the true price of a traded asset. Even though this inference may be too complicated to be carried out by the average market participant, market forces act as if this was the average behavior as traders with incorrect estimates would incur losses and would eventually be driven out of the market. Only traders with correct beliefs survive. This is referred to as the market selection argument for the informational efficiency of prices [10] . While this line of reasoning provides a helpful account of the informational role of prices, it is based on the assumption that the true price is somehow exogenously given and remains unchanged during the process of price discovery. In light of the above arguments this is an unlikely situation. But this means that also the theories on agent learning from prices need to be reviewed.
Work has been going on since 2012 at the Center for Systems Science at Yale which studies the stability and convergence of mutual adaptation processes [11] , [12] and which the first author is involved in [13] , [14] . The aim of this paper is to introduce a framework for estimating the expectation models of others not in the sense of imitating them but in the sense of anticipating what could be the dominant expectation.
Problem Statement
Suppose the uncertainty around p * can be described by two scenarios p * 1 and p * 2 . If p * 1 < p < p * 2 the question is which of the two fair values is likely to come "true" over future trading sessions. If we knew all agents who support p * 1 or p * 2 (as well as their susceptibility to change opinions) we could base our decision on the current relative importance of the scenarios. If market participants are able to change their opinion (which they are) the effective "true" price of the asset becomes a moving target. A standard way then would be to observe outcomes, i.e. traded prices p over time. This would eventually reveal whether p was generated from a distribution centered around p * 1 or p * 2 . However, this is a slow process that relies on the assumption of an even lower switching rate between the two alternatives.
Our approach is to decide on the basis of the performance of related assets, i.e. to collect contemporaneous evidence in a cross-section of returns. The rationale is that opinion formation around price targets is made for all investable assets simultaneously using similar, overlapping arguments. We define the relation among assets indirectly using common links they may have to the available signals. If multiple assets depend on similar signals they form a group. As new data becomes available the signal dependencies are re-evaluated. If the group persists we conclude that the common signal is still a valid one. If, on the other hand, the group members connect to an entirely new set of signals we suspect that a regime shift has taken place and the dependencies -even of assets that still connect to the original signal-may need to be updated. The signal sensitivities differ among assets and give rise to different speeds at which the information contained in the signal is priced in. Within any group there will be members that are more susceptible to a change in driving factors. The idea is to systematically use this information in order to select relevant signals for the investment decision at hand.
Formal Description
Let x be an m-dimensional vector of asset returns and s be an n-dimensional vector of signals. Returns are obtained at instant of time t + 1 due to investments made at instant t. We assume that investors hold their positions over a period [t, t + Q − 1], Q > 1. During that period they collect signals s t to prepare for the following trading decision at t + Q. For simplicity we assume that asset returns are binary variables x ∈ {0, 1} m where 1 corresponds to x >x above some thresholdx > 0. Likewise s ∈ {0, 1} n , which allows us to combine both continuous inputs s >s,s > 0, as well as discrete occurrences (e.g. of news articles). In summary, our market model consists of the multinomial distribution p(X t+1 , S t ) where the decisions (based on S t ) and outcomes X t+1 are separated by one discrete time-step. Notice that we use the subscripts generically to denote any time instant t and its follower t + 1. p(X t+1 , S t ) will be estimated over multiple realizations {x τ +1 , s τ }, τ ∈ [t, t + Q − 1]. The way signals are connected to outcomes depends on a common understanding of the relevance of the information contained in the available signals. This understanding may vary over time.
As an example, a weak currency is in general good for the local equity market of a country as it makes the export sector more competitive. However, the weakness may be an indication of political uncertainty in which case it must not be used as a signal to invest. Depending on the relative importance assigned to the arguments the new price target is p * 2 or p * 1 . As discussed in more detail below, we approximate p(X t+1 , S t ) by a tree. We factorize the joint distribution using a second-order approximation [15] with the additional constraint that target variables appear as leaves in the tree. This is realized by not admitting edges that link target variables back to signals during the greedy search for the minimum spanning tree.
Let S denote the subtree representing the distribution of signals p(S t ) (with X t+1 marginalized out). We assume that the co-dependence among signals is stationary, i.e. the structure of the tree and its edge weights are constant. Target variables connect to S via edges corresponding to conditional probabilities p(X t+1 |S t ). Let X be the set of leaf nodes. The problem addressed in this paper is that (while S is constant) the connection of X to S may change over time. We write T t = c t (X , S) for the overall tree resulting from the connection of signal nodes and leaves at instant t. Note that observations up to (x t , s t−1 ) are used in the estimation of c t (·, ·).
Node x i and its peers
Suppose we are interested in the return of asset i X i,t+1 . In the above tree this corresponds to a leaf node x i . The leaf distance given T t is defined as an m-by-m matrix D t (X ) = (d(t) ij ) in which d(t) ij is the sum of edge weights in the shortest path from leave node x i to x j . We define the neighborhood N t (x i ) = {x j | d(t) ij < θ i } as the set of nodes within a distance θ i > 0 of x i . The point to note is that there are no direct connections among leaf nodes but there will always be (at least) one signal node s l on the path between to leaves. These intermediary nodes change as X re-wires to S. This means also that leaf nodes enter and exit the neighborhood N t (x i ) as new intermediaries appear which affect the weights on the shortest path between leaves. We define the long-term neighborhood as
and H is a long lookback horizon. In other words, N h (x i ) contains the nodes, that are (statistically) close to x i over many tree generations.
The principal idea in this paper is the following: While the general tree T t is constructed by maximizing the likelihood of observations (or equivalently minimizing the sum of the edge weights between nodes) the connection of node x i is such that its distance to N h (x i ) is minimized. The intuition behind this criterion is that it is reasonable to assume that the distance among peers tends to revert to its long-term average as this corresponds to an average over many different market phases and is therefore independent of the current dependencies (of returns on signals) given by T t . We claim that the best choice for x i is to connect to a signal node from which peers appear close according to D t (X ). Other than betting on mean-reversion (of peer distance) this also incorporates information about the signal choices of a relevant sub-segment of the market as the objective is to stay close to all peers. We argue that this provides a way for estimating the expectation models of others. We summarize:
Problem statement: Given a tree-shaped signal network S and a map c t (X , S) in which all connections are determined except the one from x i to S, determine the missing connection such that the distance from x i to N h (x i ) is minimized.
A tree representation of dependencies
In this paper we limit ourselves to a simplified representation of the joint distribution which is based on co-occurrences of "ones". Divided by the total number of observations this corresponds to a hit ratio of positive returns given signals and is motivated by the fact that agents are more interested in finding profitable trade ideas (signals) than understanding the statistical properties of the market.
Dependencies among signals
We assume that, prior to our experiment, a large number H of signal realizations are available. From this set, we estimate the signal tree S. Given binary observation vectors s ∈ {0, 1} n we define the co-occurrence matrix
wheres is the H × n matrix of observations (with H, the number of observations and n the number of signals). Co-occurrences have an obvious interpretation as (negative) distances. In this paper, we define the edge weights as d ij = −χ 2 ij for any pair (i, j) of nodes with non-zero entry χ ij in C h . We compute the minimum spanning tree (MST) as the network path that connects all nodes while minimizing the total edge weight. The total weight corresponds to the maximum sum of squared co-occurrences, a quantity that will be seen to relate to the spectrum of C h . We use Prim's algorithm [16] , [17] to obtain the adjacency matrix S h of the MST. In a final step, we order S h according to its column sums. This puts nodes with a larger number of incoming edges to higher levels in the tree hierarchy.
Trees naturally embed levels of abstraction: parent nodes by definition correspond to events that co-occur with child events which are themselves not directly connected. A typical situation is given by a set of stocks driven by a common factor plus an idiosyncratic process. The factor is the parent that represents some (but not all) characteristics of the stocks. At an even higher level, the performance of multiple factors may depend on the general macro-environment so nodes such as gdp growth and consumer confidence would qualify as parents to the factor nodes. In summary, as we move towards the root of the tree we expect to see more abstract variables. We wish to make this statement a bit more precise:
Proposition 1: If a node in C h is a parent, it is also closest to the 1st principal eigenvector of the sub-matrix associated with its children.
For the proof, let s p be a parent node in the MST associated with C h and let Q =s T qsq be the sub-matrix associated with its children.s q is the H × m matrix of observations over m children nodes. Choose x ∈ R m . Thens x =s q x is a real-valued linear combination of binary occurrences in the children nodes. Its co-occurrence withs q is captured by the vector q x =s T qs x = Qx ∈ R m . We will make use of the l 2 norm of Q defined as
Proof of proposition 1: By definition, Q is non-negative and symmetric. This means that there exists a vector v ≥ 0 such that Q v = ρ(Q)v where ρ(Q) ≥ 0 is the spectral radius of Q. It follows that the rhs in equation (2) is maximized when x ∝ v. The sequences v =s q v, in turn, is the first principal component ofs q . By construction, the MST selects s p as a parent iff q χ 2 pq = s T qs p 2 2 is maximal among the available parent nodes (all nodes of S except the m children). But this means thats p maximizes the same convex utility (2) ass v except on a discrete search space defined by the tree S. ✷
Attaching return nodes
While dependencies among signals are assumed to be stationary, the dependency of target variables on signals is timevarying. Our objective is to detect which subset of signals is most relevant for an asset at a given instant of time. This is motivated by the empirical observation that despite the theoretical relevance of multiple driving factors they are not always simultaneously "at work". This is well-recognized to be a consequence of the conscious attention allocation by decision makers who are aware of their limited capacity to process all available information [18] . According to the theory of rational inattention, decision-makers allocate optimally while taking the cost of information acquisition into account. In this paper we argue, that the decision which information to process and which to ignore should be guided by our peers' information selection. The optimal attention allocation is the one that corresponds to the choice of the majority of investors as this will ultimately drive the demand/ supply of an asset. Unlike the neo-classical approach which involves solving a dynamic optimal control problem on the part of the investors we propose a simpler criterion which we believe is closer to describing actual market behavior. Our main argument is that if processing capacity is indeed limited it should not be spent on the problem of optimally selecting which information to follow. Our criterion is that investors simply follow the choices of their peers.
In the present framework we associate with every asset i (a group of) investors trading that asset. At every instant, the investors decide on important success factors for the asset they hold. We assume that this thought process can be reconstructed by measuring the co-occurrence of positive returns x t and preceding "buy" signals s t−1 . Our measurement starts at a particular instant t and includes Q realizations of signal-return pairs up to instant t. We combine these measurements in a vector ξ t = [x t s t−1 ] ∈ {0, 1} m+n and obtain the co-occurrence matrix
(3) which is the "instantaneous" version of equation (1) whereξ t is the Q × (m + n) matrix of observations over the short-run. m is the number of target variables to be attached to the signal tree S h as follows.
Let S Ct be the sub-matrix in C t corresponding to the co-occurrence of signals. We replace S Ct by the stationary adjacency matrix S h thereby effectively discarding all short-run relations that might appear in the data collected over the last Q instants. By assumption the dependencies in S Ct are stationary so any deviation from S h has to be regarded as non-informative. By contrast, the way the target variables depend on signals is allowed to change over time and we assume that Q is sufficiently large for the measured co-occurrences to be statistically significant. Every target node except the one of interest x i is attached to the signal to which it is closest in the short-run. This means that in every row x j , j = i the largest co-occurrence entry is chosen while all others are set to zero. Notice that in our construction, there are no direct links among target nodes, which means that the sub-matrix X Ct corresponding to asset returns in C t is set to zero. Also, for obvious reasons, we do not include any dependencies of signals on future returns in our model, which means that the upper right m × n block is also set to zero. At this stage, the final tree T t is almost specified except for the crucial node x i which is the asset we want to trade.
Connecting the target node x i
The row associated with x i contains all short-run co-occurrences of returns i with signals. Instead of attaching x i to the closest signal (like all the other nodes) we attach x i to the signal that allows x i to stay close the all its peers, i.e. the members x j of N t (x i ), j = i. Due to the short-run nature of our data collection, x j may connect to very different nodes in S h over successive trading rounds. This partially reflects noise in the data but also potential early signs of a regime change in the sense that a different signal is becoming relevant for predicting x j . Our idea is to exploit the cross-section N t (x i ) in order to distinguish information from noise.
As described above, all return nodes in X t+1 are connected to each other through the signal tree S h . Connections occur at all levels depending on the short-run co-dependence of returns on signals: some nodes x j share the same parent node in the signal tree while others have a common ancestor at lower levels of the tree. In either case the problem for x i is to choose a node in S h which allows x i to connect to N t (x i ) on the shortest path. Before continuing we introduce a useful device which allows us to identify pathways through the tree.
We defineS h as the transpose of S h in which all nonzero entries are set to 1 and let 1 j be the m-dimensional binary vector indicating the location of node i in X t+1 . We define the recursion
governing the (unique) transitions among tree levels, starting at the leaf level z L . Let
. . ,S k h 1 j = z 0 } be the ancestors of node x j , i.e. the set of parents visited until the root of the tree z 0 is reached after k iterations. We define
the set union of parent nodes visited by members of the neighborhood of x i at instant t. Notice that also A j depends on time as the initial condition z L will be different depending on where x j attaches to S h given the short-run data C t . The index t is omitted for notational convenience. A t (x i ) defines a sub-tree of S h with root α t . Let A t,α be the set of ancestors of α t within the complete tree S h . We define
This set corresponds to the sub-tree connecting the members of N t (x i ) to each other (including its root α t ).
Proposition 2:
The set O t (x i ) is an equivalence class with respect to the problem of finding the shortest path between x i and the elements of the set N t (x i ).
Proof: Nodes in N t (x i ) are by construction endpoints of S h . Since S h is a tree, every edge leading to endpoints has to be visited. This means that the distance to all nodes within the sub-tree O t (x i ) is equal to the sum of edge weights of O t (x i ) independent to which of its members x i connects. ✷ It follows that O t (x i ) can be regarded as a single node s * within S h . The distance to s * is set equal to the minimum weight of the edges from x i to any member of O t (x i ). The remaining problem is to find the shortest path from x i to s * through the remaining tree of S h i.e. using all the nodes in S h \ O t (x i ). This is a standard problem which we solve using Dijkstra's algorithm [19] .
Empirical Examples
We test the validity of our peer-cohesion hypothesis by means of a trading strategy on emerging market securities. A more comprehensive empirical study on currency and equity markets across different regions is currently work in progress. The example reported here concerns five (liquid) markets in Latin America: Chile, Colombia , Peru, Brazil and Mexico. In a first step, we define a set of signals which are aimed at capturing the risk vs. opportunity perception of the country by the investment community. We also add a set of signals that are not country specific but related to the general macro environment as well as the global trading activity. We obtain (mostly daily) data from Jan. 2000. This allows us to measure a long-term signal co-dependence from which we build the signal tree S h . The estimation is carried out in-sample which is still a weakness of the experiment despite the fact that the sample period represents more than a full economic cycle. We address this point as part of a further direction of research at the end of the paper. Since the problem is one of signal selection we benchmark our results against a set of ad-hoc strategies. The first benchmark is to consider the target return node similar to any other return node and attach it to the largest entry in the co-occurrence matrix without applying the Dijkstra algorithm (benchmark: adaptive-noFriends). We also consider an investment strategy that takes an equally weighted average of the signals available for a given country together with the non country specific signals (benchmark: average). As a third reference, we include the performance of the underlying market (benchmark: always on).
The tree in this experiment is composed of the signals and asset returns listed below. The following abbreviations are used in the result charts, Fig. 1 . AA XX: denotes the XX signal for the country AA. xAA# denotes return of asset # in country AA. The country abbreviations are CL-Chile, CO-Colombia, BR-Brazil, PR-Peru and MX-Mexico. The XX abbreviations are described below. The non country specific signals are denoted by YY where YY are described below. As all target variables belong to the same geographical region they are all included to belong to the same group N (x). In our experiments we pick one of the nodes x i in N (x) and treat all other nodes as its peers.
List of the country specific signals in the lower part of the chart. We study all currency spots for our Latin American universe. In most cases we see that the adaptive strategy is inactive at critical times where severe drawdowns in the underlying market took place. This provides a first indication that we may exploit the "collective wisdom" of the crowd, at least, if the crowd has been pre-selected. Staying close to peer nodes seems to allow us to detect regime changes more promptly and avoid the associated losses. The resulting improvement in risk-adjusted performance (shown in the legend) is substantial.
In Figure 2 we display snapshots of the adjacency matrices generated by the proposed method and used for the above signal selection. The green-shaded area corresponds to the signal tree S h and remains unchanged throughout the experiment. The dots in the upper part of the matrices correspond to the connections of return nodes to S h . The matrices represent configurations in which xPR1 (Peruvian spot) is the target node. This corresponds to the marked row in the upper part of the chart (line corresponding to xPR1).
In order to understand the way peers alter the signal choice of the target node we study an exemplary event in the Peruvian Sol in August 2011 as marked by the red circle in Fig. 3 . Our adaptive-noFriends benchmark suffers a drawdown caused by its connection to the DRY node which showed a positive reading of the global demand for shipping carriers. This is generally seen as a bullish signal on cyclical currencies. However, DRY is only a generic node located in the lower part of the tree and does not contain any specific information about the local market in Peru. In the proposed version, xP R1 eventually follows its peer group composed of MX, CO, BR and CL as seen in Fig.  4b . The node allowing xP R1 to connect to its peer group on a shortest path is CL M O ( the midterm momentum signal of Colombian Peso). The connection prevents from entering a long position in this critical period avoid the corresponding drawdown. In Fig. 4a and 4b we display the situation before and after the signal change in xP R1 from connecting to P EM to CL M O. The dotted edges indicate the corresponding simple shortest path (without knowledge of the peer group). 
Further directions
Apart from investigating peer cohesion effects across different markets and time-scales, the authors believe that the assumption on the stationarity of S h can be relaxed. This would also be of practical relevance as S h could be estimated on trailing data, possibly on an expanding window as more data becomes available. The associated (slow) timevariation in S h would give rise to very interesting situations where peer groups may entirely be torn apart due to a change in the co-dependence structure of signal nodes that connected them. Figure 4 : minimum spanning trees estimated with target note attached during the period around August 2011. At the beginning xP R1 connects to DRY which also corresponds to the simple shortest path (without awareness of the peer group) (not shown). Later that month, (a) a new simple shortest path towards DRY is taken by the benchmark while the peer algorithm remains connected to P EM as this represents the shortest path to the peers shown in yellow. This is supported by the thickness of the edges representing the strength of the co-occurrences. At a later stage, (b) new data support a connection of xP R1 to the direct of the peer group ( CL M O). 
